Clientelistic relationship poems

Patronage in ancient Rome - Wikipedia

Poems about relationships in trouble. The real test of a relationship is being there when the going gets tough. Poetry about Complicated relationship by teenagers. media from the perspective of clientelism in the post-Communist and cultural Keywords: party-market corporatism; patron-client relationship; clientelism; media . Clientelism (patronage) is definitely not a novel social phenomenon. Though it is a herent exchange relationship, which brings patrons and clients together for Ajanaku for poems which describe the quality of an elder). A.

In the Musharraf era, his son also entered politics, was elected and became minister of state for finance. Both his sons are now active politicians and have consistently won elections. In all three cases, right-wing nationalistic ideology, wealth amassed during arbitrary rule and the overt support of intelligence agencies has been evident. In all the three cases cited, rural or tribal networks have mattered less than using the family legacy and creating a network of clients in the local constituencies.

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The civil-military bureaucracy that has ruled Pakistan for most of its existence, directly or indirectly, has also encouraged the emergence of dynastic politics in Pakistan. The military in Pakistan has found it easier to negotiate and handle political elites due to the family-politics-syndrome. If anything, the military has also joined in the trend and their long periods of rule have contributed to the fortification and perhaps entrenchment of political dynasties.

They too have capitalized on the insecurity of politicians due to the meddling of unelected institutions such as the military by keeping it all in the family. This monopoly of violence is necessary because politicians as patrons need to be able to protect constituents by translating their interests to the state in exchange for a vote. In such societies informal institutions, such as the biradari and ethnic bonds, can skew public opinion.

There is a lot of discussion around the mechanisms of control that these families can exercise. The ruler buys the loyalty of his clients in return for appointments to public office. This patrimonial patron-client relationship is also evident in Pakistan where political parties are clientelist in nature. Once a leader is secure in his position of power, a circle of advisors and a successor in the event of death or ouster is hand-picked.

In South Asia, the patron-client relationships are feudalistic and embody the relationships of personal obligation and sentiments. The price includes long periods in jail, exile, harassment by the intelligence services, death threats and awareness that far too often the law offers them minimum protection when they are in opposition.

Indeed, intellectuals and economists are more willing to serve military regimes than elected civilian ones, in part because those with a professional rather than a family background are at a disadvantage in electoral politics. Hence, their penchant for technocratic solutions and willingness to work with military dictators. A lack of democracy within political parties has been termed as a major impediment in improving the way electoral politics works.

Consequently, only enhanced internal democracy and established rules of the game can make way for merit based leadership of political parties.

Raza Ahmad Rumi, Dynasties and clientelism in Pakistan

Until the passage of this constitutional amendment inthere was a constitutional imperative to hold internal elections within political parties. Nevertheless, the Political Parties Act still demands that parties hold internal elections and present reports to the Election Commission.

T herefore, the role of an Election Commission becomes paramount in transitional democracies such as Pakistan. Only independent, legitimate and powerful commissions can regulate the affairs of political parties and in the long term allow for the growth of a less clientelistic mode of politics. In this context it is also important that the political parties expand their popular support base outside the confines of their limited ethnic, sectarian or clannish pockets.

Reportedly he had ventured out of his home to vote. Those he voted for did not come to his assistance to secure him justice against the inhuman treatment accorded to him by Army.

Voters in clientelistic systems call themselves modern because they enjoy right to vote, own houses, drive cars, wear jeans, carry hi-tech mobiles, drink Pepsi, eat Uncle Chips. I call them Faction-Running Outsiders because they run personalized factions and remain away from elections. As of now there are dozens of such factions collectively called Hurriyat Conference. As for example they react to human rights violations by armed forces with hartal and chalo strike and protest march.

Establishment has over time read them and their tactics very well; and has mastered the art of foiling protest marches by placing restrictions on the movement of people in particular areas. Huriyat tactics of collective reaction has led to political stagnation; and institutional rigidity because they resist change. Therefore they are responsible for political decay.

By supporting this political decadence we again behave as political serfs. But they are one in their use of Islamist rhetoric to rally public support. Yet they hold, as every Kashmiris does, at least two provisions of this same Constitution dear to heart. These provisions are called Articles and 35A. They neglect the fact that continued rejectionist election boycott policy may bring into existence a provincial Legislative Assembly supportive of the idea of abrogation of these provisions of the Constitution of India as proposed by BJP.

The latter will then become Clientelistic Insiders. Clientelism will take hold of Kashmir with renewed vigour. Kashmir needs to reform its faction-running and clientelism. One individual or a small group cannot achieve this goal. Only a coalition of committed reformers can do so and that too with difficulty. First and foremost, Kashmir needs a cadre-based, cadre-funded, independent-minded, programmatic, election-participating party to guide people politically.

Local politicians, having developed entrenched interests in the status quo, may not like the idea. India, Pakistan, America, Saudi Arabia, etc. Civil society could take the initiative in its hands. Why don't Dekel et al. Moreover, of the studies offered by Robinson and VerdierRobinson and Torvikand Keefer and Vlaicuwe highlight the analysis proposed by Robinson and Verdier for a methodological reason that is important in this article: They establish that the patron-operator relationship is equivalent to the operator-voter relationship.

It is unclear why for these authors the patron-operator relationship, which involves informal contracts of personal and political attachment, is a relationship equivalent to the operator-voter relationship, which takes place in a market and in which the payment that the voter receives from the operator never constitutes a favor or hand-out that compromises their freedom or autonomy.

It is not in vain that Robinson and Verdier formally describe the clientelistic structure of the political organization as a network, affirming that the exchange of votes for economic payments or jobs takes place in that network Robinson and Verdier2.

Vicente and Wantchekon's very comprehensive review of the literature shows how vote buying in a context of networks, in which the patron-client and client-voter relationship are methodologically distinguished, has not yet been explicitly explored, nor have its implications for wealth distribution in the very specific context considered in this article. Therefore, the results established in this article are genuinely different from previous findings in the literature.

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Voters in Colombia and the political economy. In regard to the behavior of voters in Colombia, Parada offers a study in which he analyzes We use a sample of individuals naturally motivated by real candidates. Then, in our methodology we do not induce preferences Parada In this exercise, Parada relies on Weber and Myerson's model.

This model is part of the family of models arising from the political economy inaugurated by Downs that describes the set of institutional characteristics of politics in the developed West, and where one of its more notable characteristics is the high level of institutional formality of party systems. Thus, the Weber and Myerson model assumes the existence of political organizations in which the difference between the formal structure and the actual organization is minimal Freidenberg and Levitsky In other words, it describes a political system which, in addition to its high degree of institutional sophistication, with no room for mechanisms of political and economic coercion, it only has political actors who are so morally aseptic that they do not become involved in political clientelism, vote buying, electoral system alteration practices, influence trafficking, contracting kickbacks, bribery, payoffs, and looting of public resources.

Parada, in a kind of intellectual initiation rite of ideological duplication that we haven't witnessed, has accepted this world as the place where he resides. This constitutes an asinine act of negation of the exterior world when placed in the immediacy of political and administrative events of recent memory in the Colombian political system. The statistical analysis offered by Parada is another incursion into the political analysis practices based on the Robinsonian and de-institutionalized figure of the consumer from microeconomic theory, which has been used to construct a certain theory of democracy in political economy.

In the words of Weber and Myerson, Voting equilibria based on polls are somewhat analogous to competitive equilibria based on prices in economic markets. In a pure exchange economy, buyers have preferences for various bundles of commodities. Trading behavior, which generates prices, is driven by the buyers' perceptions of the prices they will confront.

clientelism

At equilibrium, prices summarize demand, and simultaneously generate that same demand. The study of competitive equilibria does not require specification of the precise mechanism by which individual market participants adjust their behavior as the market moves toward equilibrium. Similarly, a detailed model of the process by which a voting equilibrium might be reached is not essential to the definition and computation of voting equilibria Weber and Myerson The use of a model such as that proposed by Weber and Myerson to analyze electoral phenomena in Colombia in particular and in Latin America in general can only be the symptom of a certain class of psychopathology, based on the psychic mechanism of forgetfulness that Freud analyzed in some modules of his theory of psychoanalysis.

Parada's oversight of the specificities of the behavior of political institutions in Colombia is not merely forgetfulness: In his intent to avoid touching subjects as thorny as those related to the practices of party systems in Colombia, Parada has repressed his goal of describing those institutional characteristics by choosing to use Weber and Myerson's model.

A certain displacement mechanism has been activated in the analysis process that must have led to the construction of a theoretical model that describes that institutional plot in which voters and parties act. This led Parada, unfortunately, toward an erroneous substitute: Weber and Myerson's model.

Orthodox political economy has sought to explain the choice of the set of public policies that make up the status quo in a political system based on the political platforms promoted by the parties in elections. However, there is nothing more distant from Colombia's political and institutional reality. The median voter theorem is flagrant proof of this, as it is used to affirm that " The problem is that in many areas of Colombia, whether municipalities or departments, the lower the income of the median voter, the greater the redistributive trend, but of an inequitable nature Vieira and Cariboni, It is strange that Parada is unaware of this, particularly when Why doesn't Parada look to more recent and pertinent literature on political economy, given that the breakdown of the relationship between inequity and median voter income is a phenomenon that has begun to be recognized in more recent literature and treated with the construction of certain rational choice models?

Precisely, Hans Gruner states that In particular one observes that fiscal variables such as the size of the redistributive government sector are not related to measures of inequality. According to the data, a given unequal distribution may be politically stable even in the presence of large inequalities Gruner However, Gruner seeks to explain the aforementioned breakdown by assuming, based on a standard model of political competition, that voters have the capacity to activate in the parties a certain mechanism of political representation such that they assume that the political platform announced by the party they vote for will be implemented once it becomes the governing party.

It is precisely because of this that "political consensus among voters may explain the missing link between inequality and redistribution" Gruner Nevertheless, while it is true that the rupture indicated by Gruner has taken place in Latin America, it is also true that this rupture has taken place within a political system in which the parties, in many areas, do not politically represent the needs and desires of voters.

It should be observed that the political system, as a structure, exhibits properties of a local character in each possible configuration of the party system in each territorial entity, ceteris paribus. This is not taken into account by Parada, who is unaware that the relationship between electoral abstention and the absence of political representation that has arisen in the Colombian political system has no place in orthodox political economy: What is ironic is that the militants of orthodox political economy themselves have taken it upon themselves to show that models that admitted the existence of the political abstention phenomenon in the presence of political representation were poorly constructed in methodological terms.

In ef fect, the standard political economy models that involve the abstention phenomenon, whether from the rational choice hypothesis or uncertainty about vote behavior Ledyard,do so based on certain considerations about the relationship between the voting expense and the expected utility hypothesis Ferejohn and Fiorina Thus, many authors have reached a disturbing conclusion in the context of abstentionist models: No rational voter votes in elections with a very large number of voters, as the expected benefit is strictly lower than the cost involved in going out to vote.

This is an abstention that appears as a result of the belief of each individual regarding the decisiveness of their vote, and not based on the perception of whether one is politically represented by the party and the political platform to which they would allocate their vote Roemer ; Chamberlain and Rothschild